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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
OSBORNE ALLEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROSE PARK PHARMACY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 7'672 
BRIEF OF RESPOND·ENT 
STATEMENT ·OF THE FACTS 
Because the statement of facts as set forth in 
appellant's brief is not all inclusive, it is respondent's 
desire to apprise the court of certain facts he deems 
important that have been excluded from appellant's 
brief. 
In the early f.all of 1949 plaintiff approached the 
owners of defendant corporation about going to work 
for them as a pharmacist and manager of their new 
drugstore and pharmacy at 4th North and Oakley 
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Streets (between 11th and 12th West) in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (R. 31) Negotiations ripened into an agree-
ment whereby plaintiff was to manage the store .and 
share in the net profits and thereby acquire stock in 
the corporation to the extent of 25o/o ownership. (R. 34) 
Meantime plaintiff was working as a pharmacist for 
W algreens, but immediately proceeded to work for 
defendant in his off-hours in helping the Geurts brothers, 
the owners of the defendant corporation, purchase 
equipment, supplies and merchandise for the new store. 
This he did for a period of four or five weeks before 
he was put on defendant's payroll, which occurred 
November 18, 1949. At the same time he was termi-
nated at Walgreens. Undenied is plaintiff's testimony 
that: 
''. . . I went out 100% to help these fello·ws. 
I didn't insist on receiving any salary for this 
at all because my whole heart was in the store. 
So I put in all this time with Ted without receiv-
ing any pay to the time I terminated from Wal-
greens. . . . '' (R. 34 & 35) 
According to plaintiff's testimony it was not until 
after Christmas, over two months from the time he 
started to work f.or defendant, that the Geurts brothers 
presented him with a copy of the written contract to 
sign, which included a provision permitting defendant 
to terminate the contract without cause on 30 days 
notice, and the following negative covenant: 
"8. ~Osborne ~agrees that in the event of 
termination of this contract for any reason, he 
shall fully account for all funds, inventory, assets 
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and equipment and hP shall not direetly or in-
dirertly eon1pete, as an en1ployee or principal, 
in the operation of a drug store or pharmacy 
"\Yithin a radius of t\YO miles of this drug store 
for a period of fiye years thereafter. Breach 
or threatened breach of the tern1s of employment 
shall entitle this Pharmacy to injunctive relief 
in addition to other ren1edies." (R. 5 & 6) 
There had been no discussion of these provisions 'vi th 
plaintiff before this time, and, of course, having al-
ready given up his employment at Walgreens, and 
'Yorked for defendant for over two months, he signed 
the contract. (R. 35 & 36) 
Plaintiff employed his wife, and together they 
worked sixteen to eighteen hours a day in order to 
build up the business which grew to a ''fairly good 
volume". (R. 36 & 37) Plaintiff and his wife lived 
near the drug store and had many friends and neigh-
bors who patronized the store because of their close 
friendship. (R. 38) Plaintiff's employment continued 
for about a year when on November 14, 1950, plaintiff 
was served with a notice of termination. (R. 44 & 45) 
There was no explanation or allegation of cause for 
termination, and, in fact, defendant's officers gave 
plaintiff an excellent letter of recommendation and a 
good "pat on the back". (R. 46) 
Plaintiff brought this action asking the court to 
declare that the negative covenant in the contract was 
unenforceable. At the trial plaintiff introduced in evi-
dence as exhibit "A" a map of Salt Lake City with a 
circle drawn in red to denote the two-mile area and 
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showing the locations of the defendant's drugstore 
and all other drugstores within the area. (R. 27) This 
evidence and plaintiff's testimony regarding it indi-
cated there were eight other drugstores operating 
within the area during the time plaintiff continued in 
employment with defendant. (R. 40) 
Concerning the territory over which the defend-
ant's business extended plaintiff testified as follows: 
"Q (By Mr.· Richards). Can you tell us the 
greatest distance to which you and your em-
ployees delivered prescriptions~ 
''A. Yes, I can give a fairly reasonable dis-
tance on that simply because I was doing the 
majority of delivering, and I was using my own 
car on that because I remember, and I can 
go by our prescription business, because the 
majority of our prescriptions have the patients' 
address. The furthest east on prescriptions, and 
there was one only, was at Second West ·and 
North Temple. 
''Q. How did you come to deliver that~ 
"A. I went up at about twelve-thirty in the 
morning, and the doctor had called me, and the 
store was closed, and asked me if I would send 
up the prescription to him. The doctor that 
called there was a very close friend of mine, 
and he was giving me his prescription volume 
for that reason. He asked me if I would take it 
up to them, and it was Dr. Harvey Moore. 
"Q. Would you say that you delivered many 
prescriptions east of Eighth West~ 
''A. The prescription volume which we were 
doing out there was mostly pediatric work, chil-
dren, simply because the prescription volume 
was coming from just about Rose Park people. 
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"'Q. Ho"~ do you know that~ 
"· .. A.. Because the type of pre~eription. y· ou 
can tell \Yhether it i8 for a child or an adult, 
and from the type of physician that calls, and 
also because of the thiekly populated area In 
Rose Park for children. 
~ 'Q. Can you tell from the addresses~ 
'• ..... \. I \Yould say that the volume of our 
prescription business ''Tas located in Rose Park 
proper. 
'' Q. Specify please, if you can, were many 
prescriptions delivered east of Eighth West~ 
'• A. , ... ery few east of Eighth West. 
~ 'Q. \\-.-ere very many delivered south of 
X orth Temple~ 
~ ' .... \. Why, I remember delivering one out 
there in a late evening on the same call for 
Dr. :\Ioore. I went down as low as Ninth South 
on one of them, one only. 
"Q. One only~ 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. Would that be the only prescription 
south of North Temple that you delivered~ 
"A. To my knowledge, yes." (R. 39-40) 
With respect to the profits in the new business 
plaintiff gave the following testimony: 
''Q (By Mr. Richards). Now, did you notice 
any appreciable increase in the volume of pre-
scriptions during the time you were there~ 
''A. Yes, our opening day we had three 
prescriptions on record. At the time of termi-
nation we had filled 5,248 new prescriptions, 
1,7 40 refills, a total of 6,988 prescriptions. And 
that figured out for thE;i number of days that I 
had worked in this drug store, 20.6 prescrip-
tions per day. 
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"Q. That is an average over the whole year~ 
"A. That is an average at the time I was 
employed, from the time of first employment 
until the time of termination. 
'' Q. Do you have any idea of the average 
number of prescriptions the last month of your 
employment per day, the number per day~ 
''A. It would be a greater percentage than 
this because naturally your business just builds 
up as you go along. So for an average of 
twenty prescriptions for the last month of opera-
tion, I imagine, the prescriptions would aver-
age up around thirty or forty. That is includ-
ing new prescriptions and refills. 
'' Q. You stated awhile ago that the drug 
store operated at a loss, I believe, the first 
few months. 
''A. When we took our first inventory which 
was in June, Martell and I worked very closely 
together. 
' 'Q. Who is Martell~ 
''A. Martell was employed as a bookkeeper. 
I managed the drug store. 
* * * 
"Q. Did you have discussions with him with 
respect to the profits and loss and increase and 
decrease in business, etc. ~ 
''A. Yes, discussions and reports. 
'' Q. What were those discussions~ 
"MR. PuGsLEY: We object to that as hearsay. 
''THE CouRT : I don't know that it would be 
hearsay, but it might not be the best evidence. 
You are trying to show whether the company 
operated at a profit. They would be entitled to 
see the Profit and Loss Statement. 
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· · Q (By ~lr. Richards). Did you see the 
Profit and Loss Statement'? 
· '_..:\... Yes. ~ ot only sa"T then1, but I was given 
a record of the report. Those \Yere given out 
to Theodore, \\ ... illiam T. Geurts, and myself. 
Three reports \Yere n1ade out. 
H Q. \\'hat did they sho\Y generally for the 
first fe\v n1onths ·? 
-' .._-\.. They shovved \Ye operated at a loss for 
the first six months. 
'' Q. \\ ... hen did they begin showing a profit~ 
'~ ~IR. PrGSLEY: \Y-e object to that as im-
material. 
' ·THE Co-c-RT : Overruled. 
'' .._-\.. They showed a profit from the July 
statement on. 
"Q (By Mr. Richards). Was that consider-
able profit~ 
"A. It was substantial profit, enough so 
that if the store continued on that operation it 
would show an overall profit for the year, tak-
ing care of the first six months' loss.'' (R. 41-43) 
At the conclusion of the trial the court announced 
its decision in favor of the plaintiff as set f.orth in 
appellant's brief and made findings to the effect that 
there was no proper consideration to support the plain-
tiff's negative covenant, that the 30 days notice was 
too short a period to constitute mutuality of obliga-
ion to support said covenant and was an unreason-
able restraint of trade. The court found further 
that although the five-year period of non-competition 
was reasonable, the interdicted area described by a 
two-mile radius was unreasonable, and that plaintiff 
while working for defendant had acquired nothing in 
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8 
the nature of trade secrets. (R. 15-16) Appellant desig-
nates these findings and the court's judgment declaring 
paragraph 8 of the contract unenforceable as points 
of error. (R. 19-20) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
THE NEGATIVE COVENANT WAS UNREASONABLE 
WITH RESPECT To· SPACE. 
II. 
THE NEGATIVE COVENANT WAS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY A PROPER CONSIDERATION NOR WAS THERE 
MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION. 
III. 
IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO CASES CITED BY 
APPELLANT PLAINTIFF HEREIN ACQUIRED NO TRADE 
SECRETS. 
IV. 
THE QUESTION OF ESTO·PPEL CANNOT FIRST BE 
RAISED ON APPEAL. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE NEGATIVE COVENANT WAS UNREASONABLE 
WITH RESPECT TO SPACE. 
It was once generally the law of England that 
all contracts containing negative covenants of the sort 
in plaintiff's contract of employ:ment were invalid and 
unenforceable as against public policy. Every man 
had the right to work, and to restrict him in any 
degree was to limit his ability to gain a livelihood, 
which meant that he and his dependents may become 
public charges. As communication and transportation 
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9 
has beco1ne Inore available and as men have become 
more educated and trained and more flexible in their 
ability to engage in more than one trade, the law has 
relaxed son1ewhat in favor of the principle of freedom 
of contract. See ''i"illiston on Contracts, Revised Edi-
tion, \"" olun1e 3, page 4578, Section 1635. The law is 
relaxed to that point that as long as the restraint in 
length of time and area of space is reasonable the 
negative covenant is enforceable and valid, but if the 
restrictions are more than are necessary to the rea-
sonable protection of the employer, or if they are unduly 
oppressive to the employee courts of equity have 
refused to enforce them by injunctions. 
There is a great field of law on the subject, and 
the cases, of course, go both ways depending upon the 
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. In W is-
consin Ice ~ Coal Co. v. Lueth, et al. (1933), 213 Wis. 
4:2, 250 N.v\r. 819 plaintiff employed defendant to 
deliver ice and solicit business with a negative cove-
nant from the defendant not, for a period of two 
years after leaving the employ of plaintiff, to deliver 
ice or solicit business either on behalf of himself or 
any other person or company, in a certain territory 
in the city of Milwaukee, which territory was spe-
cifically and particularly set forth in the contract by 
its streets boundaries. The court found that the de-
fendant voluntarily quit the plaintiff's employ. It was 
held that in spite of this fact, and because of the 
unreasonableness of the restrictions the contract was 
unenforceable. The court said: 
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''So, in the case of the employee, the restric-
tive covenant must bear some relation to the 
activities of the employee. It must not restrain 
his activities in a territory into which his for-
mer work has not taken him or given him the 
opportunity to enjoy undue advantages in later 
competition :with his employer.'' 
"* * * * The principal difficulty arising, how-
ever, where the contract of employment contain-
ing the restrictive covenant initiates the relation 
of employer and employee. There the employee, 
at the time of executing the contract, has as yet 
no established route which will form a reasonable 
limit to the scope of the restrictive covenant. 
He may be assigned to work at any place within 
the territory actively canvassed by his employer. 
May the employer, in such a situation, designate 
a territory less than the entire territory covered 
by its business but greater than that which will 
be worked at any one time by the employee, and 
perhaps greater than ever will be worked by the 
employee during the Gourse of his employment, 
and d~signate this territory as that to which the 
noncompeting agreement is applicable~ There 
is no question, from an examination of the rec-
ord, that the territory described in the contract 
here involved is more extensive than that in 
which defendant worked for the Kilbourn Com-
pany. It is larger than that in which defendant, 
subsequent to the making of the contract, worked 
for the plaintiff; in fact, it was large enough, 
'according to the evidence, to be cared for by 
some forty-five drivers, and larger than the 
defendant could work, unless his employment for 
the plaintiff extended over a very long period 
of time." 
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11 
Plaintiff in the principle case testified that the 
interdicted area extends \Yay beyond the trade area of 
defendant drug·store. The ronrt in the \V'isconsin case 
L 
concludes: 
··It is our conclusion that this restriction 
,,~as broader than \Yas called for by the neces-
sities of the case, and that, while the contract 
might in other respects be proper and valid, it 
cannot be enforced. 
''For the foregoing reasons it follows that 
the judgment must be reversed.'' 
The court refused to grant an injunction in The 
Sanznel Stores v. Abranzs (1919), 94 Conn. 248, 108 A. 
541, 9 ..._\.L.R. 1450, restraining the defendant from 
engaging in a business similar to that of plaintiff 
not\vithstanding defendant had previously entered into 
an employment agreement with plaintiff in November 
of 1918, agreeing not to so engage in such business 
directly or indirectly for 5 years after the termination 
of his employment, and who on December of the same 
year voluntarily quit his employment with the plain-
tiff to so enter and engage in the same business and 
in the same city where plaintiff operated a store. The 
court in discussing the difference between restrictive 
covenants in connection with employment contract and 
restrictive covenants ancillary to sale of business con-
tracts, makes the following observation: 
"Under the law, restrictive stipulations in 
agreements between employer and employee are 
not viewed with the same indulgence as such 
stipulations between a vendor and vendee of a 
business and its good will. 
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''In the latter case, the restrictions add to 
the value of what the vendor wishes to sell, 
and also add to the value of what the vendee pur-
chases. In such cases also the parties are pre-
sumably more nearly on a parity in ability to 
negotiation of agreement between employer and 
employee'' 
''The reasonable and fair protection of the 
plaintiff's business does not require such an 
extended restriction of the defendant's field of 
employment. Public policy requires that the de-
fendant's liberty of action in trading or employ-
ment shall not be unduly restricted. To enforce 
the sweeping terms of this restriction would be 
a useless, unnecessary, and undue curtailment 
of the defendant's liberty of trading and em-
ployment, and an unjustified restraint on com-
petition." 
There appears an extensive annotation to the 
Samuel Stores case in 9 A.L.R. 1456 concerning restric-
tive covenants in employment contracts. It is apparent 
from this annotation that the law is fairly well 
settled to the effect that the enforceability of these 
covenants depends upon the reasonableness of the 
terms of the covenant as to time and space. A general 
statement of the law as found at page 1467 reads as 
follows: 
"The validity of such contracts, however, is 
more directly presented in the second class of 
cases, i.e., covenant by the employee not to en-
gage for himself or for others in a competing 
business for a definite period of time, and gen-
erally within certain prescribed boundaries. The 
denial of relief for the breach of such covenants 
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is generally based upon the ground, either that 
the contract is violative of public policy and 
hence inYalid, that there is an adequate remedy 
at lR\V, or that the contract is oppressive and 
imposes undue hardship upon the employee. 
\\~hile the san1e general principles of law apply to 
covenants of the latter class that apply to sirni-
lar covenants ancillary to the sale of a business, 
nevertheless covenants of this kind by en1ployees 
are more carefully scrutinized by the courts, 
and relief more readily denied, since the courts, 
generally, realize that a too ready enforcement 
of them may result in depriving the covenantor 
of the means of livelihood, and perchance cause 
him to become a charge upon the public.'' 
There are many cases cited in this annotation and 
rn result they run about fifty-fifty-half of them hold 
the covenants reaso:o.able and enforceable and the other 
half hold them unreasonable and unenforceable. This 
indicates that each case must be decided upon its own 
facts. This annotation has been supplemented in 20 
A.L.R. 1363, 67 A.L.R. 1002, and 98 A.L.R. 963. Each 
citing many new cases considering this problem. 
In Herreshoff v. Boutineau (1890), 17 R.I. 3, 8 
L.R.A. 469, 33 Am. St. Rep. 850, 19 Atl. 712, the de-
fendant employee took a position in a school of lan-
guages as a teacher of French and German for a 
period of 6 months. In contracting for this employ-, 
ment, he agreed not to teach French or German in the 
State of Rhode Island during one year after the end 
of his employment. At the end of employment he pro-
ceeded to teach these languages in the city of Providence 
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1n violation of the contract. In holding the contract 
unenforceable, the court makes the following obser-
vations: 
''Is the contract unreasonable~ Courts should 
be slow to set aside as unreasonable a restric-
tion which has formed a part of the considera-
tion of a contract; yet, when it is a restriction 
upon individual and common rights, which only 
oppresses one party without benefiting the other, 
all courts agree that it should not be enforced." 
''In many undertakings, with modern methods 
of advertising and facilities for ordering by tele-
graph or mail, and sending goods by railroad 
or express, it would matter little whether one 
was located at Providence or Boston or some 
other place. In such cases a restriction embrac-
ing the state, or even a larger territory, could 
not be said on that account to be unreasonable; 
for without it the seller might immediately de-
stroy the value of what he sold and was paid 
for. But it is unreasonable to ask courts to en-
force a greater restriction than is needed. So 
it has been uniformly held that restrictions which 
go too far are void. As was said in the note of 
the Law Quarterly Review, above cited: 'Cove-
nan tees desiring the maximum of protection 
have, no doubt, a difficult task. When they fail, 
it is commonly because, like the dog in the fable, 
they grasp at too much, and so lost all.' 
''In the present case, we think the restric-
tion is unreasonable. Not as a rule of law be-
cause it extends throughout the state, but be-
cau,se it extends beyond any apparently neces-
sary protection which the comp.Zaintarnt might 
reasonably require, and thus, without benefiting 
him, it oppresses the respondent, and deprives 
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people in other places of the clHutce 1rh ich 'Jnigh t 
be offered the1n to learn the 111reuch and Ge'l·;;utn 
lang.;t,ages of the respondent." (Italics by re-
spondent) 
Fron1 the above annotation in 9 ..c\.L.R. is taken the 
follo,ving comment at page 1477: 
··In Pearks v. Cullen (191~), 28 Times L. R. 
(Eng.) 371, the court refused to restrain the 
breach of a covenant by a shop assistant not, 
for tw·o years after termination of his con-
tract of employment, to engage in a similar 
business within 2 miles of the place of employ-
ment, or to solicit from any of the customers of 
his employer. This covenant \vas held not rea-
sonably necess~ry for the protection of the em-
ployer's business, it appearing that clauses of 
this character were unusual, and not neces-
sary for protection against shop assistants. 
The \vriter does not have available the original re-
port of Pearks v. Cullen, and is therefore unable to 
give any more facts about the case. 
In a leading English case, Atwood v. LaMont 
(1920), 3 K.B. (Eng.) 571, the plaintiff carried on a 
business as a draper, tailor, and general outfitter. When 
he employed the defendant, the defendant agreed that 
upon the termination of his employment, he would 
never engage in the trades of tailor, dressmaker, gen-
eral draper, millinery, hatter, habber dasher, etc. etc., 
at any place within a radius of 10 miles of the plain-
tiff's store, nor to trade with any persons within that 
radius in opposition to the plaintiff. After working 
for the plaintiff as a tailor for 10 years, defendant left 
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the plaintiff's employ and engaged in the tailoring 
business outside the 10 mile radius but served customers 
from within the 10 mile radius and who were previously 
customers of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought an in-
junction restraining this trade and the court held that 
the contract was in restraint of trade and unenforce-
able. Younger, L. J., discussed among others three 
points in connection with this problem. First, that the 
covenantee has the burden of proving that the restric-
ion goes no further than is reasonable for the protec-
tion of his business. Second, that the restraint must 
also be reasonable so far as the restriction upon the 
employee is concerned. That it must not be unduly 
oppressive to the employee. Thirdly, he explains the 
distinction in the law between the ca.se of a covenant 
ancillary to the sale of a business and the case of a 
covenant by an employee as follows: 
"There are at least two reasons for this dis-
tinction. An employer may not, after his serv-
ant has left his employment, prevent that serv-
ant from using his own skill and knowledge in 
his trade or profession, even if acquired when 
in the employer's service. That skill and knowl-
edge are only placed at the employer's disposal 
during the employment. They have not been 
made a subject of sale after that employment 
has ceased. ' ' 
''Accordingly covenants against competition 
by a former servant are as such not upheld; 
and the permissible extent of any covenant im-
posed upon a servant must be tested in every 
case with reference to the character of the work 
done for the employer by the servant while in 
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his service and by the consideration whether in 
that vie\Y the covenant taken fron1 him goes 
further than is reasonably necessary for the pro-
tection of the proprietary rights of the eove-
nantee. "·The reason, and the only reason,'' 
says Lord Parker in nlorris v. Saxelby ( 3) 'for 
upholding such a restraint on the part of an em-
ployee is that the employer has some priorietary 
right, \Yhether in the nature of trade connection 
or in the nature of trade secrets, for the pro-
tection of \Yhich such a restraint is-having re-
gard to the duties of the employee-reasonably 
necessary. Such a restraint has, so far as I 
know, never been upheld, if directed only to the 
prevention of competition or against the use of 
the personal skill and knowledge acquired by 
the employee in his employer's business.''' 
In Kadis t·. Britt (1944), 224 N.C. 154, 29 S. E. 2d 
543, 152 A.L.R. 405, plaintiff was engaged in the cloth-
ing store business. Defendant had been employed for 
years as a delivery man and bill collector. After years 
of employment defendant entered into a contract with 
plaintiff \Yhereby plaintiff could terminate plaintiff'~ 
services anytime and defendant was restricted from com-
peting in the county or any adjoining county for 2 
years following the termination. After two more years 
plaintiff fired the defendant; and when the defendant 
vvent to work in a similar establishment plaintiff brought 
an injunction. In denying the injunction the court said, 
''The restrictive negative covenant in a con-
tract ·of this sort, to be legally effective, must be 
ancillary to a valid affirmative covenant, and 
examination by the court is necessarily directed 
to the substance and validity of this covenant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
When the contract is defective for want of leg-
ally protectible subject or because its practical 
effect is merely to stifle normal competition, it 
is as much offensive to public policy as it ever 
was in promoting monoply at the public ex-
pense and is bad. Hence, the trend of discrimi-
nating decision is away from the latitude by 
which contracts in restraint of employment have 
been upheld almost as a matter of course, or 
upon a merely plausible showing of some 
shadowy right to which the negative covenant 
is ancillary. The grave consequences of unem-
ployment demand that the principle affirmative 
p-romise, and its basis or subject be examined 
and weigh ted with care. ' ' 
Defendant at the trial failed to sustain the burden 
of showing the reasonableness of plaintiff's negative 
covenant, and it would have to have accomplished that 
before the court could have found for the defendant. 
The cases clearly place this burd~n on the covenantee. 
Roy v. Bold!uc (1943), 140 Me. 103, 34 Atl. 2d 479, 149 
A.L.R. 630, 633, Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Ma.son, 217 
Ky. 269, 289 S.W. 295, 52 A.L.R. 1344. In the Kadis v. 
Britt case, supra, the court placed this burden squarely 
upon the covenantee. Quoting from 17 CJS, Contracts, 
sec. 240, the court said: 
'' .... Contracts in partial restraint of trade 
do not escape the condemnation of public policy 
unless they possess qualifying conditions which 
bring them within that exception. They are still 
contrary to public policy and void ''if nothing 
shows them to be reasonable.' Benjamin on Sale, 
7th Ed, p 535 ; id., p 538, quoting Tindal, C. J. in 
Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 743. They must be 
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~npported under the rule \Yhich plaees the bur-
den upon those \Yho \Yould nYnil themselves of 
an exeeption-nt least to the extPnt that their 
reasonablene~s n1ust be Inade to appear.'' 
.. A_s a coneluding re~ume of the la\Y with respect to 
the enforceability of negative eovenants the terms of 
·which are unreasonable sections from Corpus Juris 
Seeundu1n and the Restatement are quoted herein. 
17 C.J.S., Contracts, Sec. 254, page 636. 
''Restrictive covenants contained in a con-
tract of hiring are tested by the same standard 
of reasonableness of the restraint as are similar 
covenants in a contract of sale, but covenants 
of the former sort are not viewed by the courts 
with the same indulgence, and a smaller scope 
for restraint is permitted. 
''Generally, while one may not be restrained 
from follo,Ying all vocations for which he is 
fitted, or from doing productive work useful to 
the community, it is the rule in the absence of 
contrary statute, that agreements by which an 
employee as part of his contract of employment 
undertakes not to enter into a competing busi-
ness on leaving his employer's service are sus-
tained if they are not wider than reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the employer's 
business, and do not impose undue hardship on 
the employee, due regard being had to the inter-
ests of the public. Under this rule contracts 
have frequently been upheld whereby sales-
men, agents, canvassers, and other employees 
who come into personal contact with their em-
ployer's customers agree not to engage in a 
competing business within a limited time or 
area after leaving their employer's service. The 
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restraint imposed by contracts of this cha.racter, 
however, is invalid if w·ider than reasonably re-
quired for the protection of the employer's busi-
ness.'' (Italics by respondent) 
Restatement of Contracts, Volume 2, page 
987, Sec. 514. 
''A restraint of trade is unreasonable, in 
the absence of statutory authorization or domi-
nant social or economic justification, if it 
(a) is greater than is required for the 
protection of the person for whose benefit the 
restraint is imposed, or 
(b) imposes undue hardship upon the per-
son restricted, or 
(c) tends to create, or has for its purpose 
to create, a monopoly, or to control prices or to 
limit production artificially or 
(d) unreasonably restricts the alienation or 
use of anything that is a subject of property, or 
(e) is based on a promise to refrain from 
competition and is not ancillary either to a con-
tract for the transfer of good-will or other sub-
ject of property or to an existing employment 
or contract of employment." 
II. 
THE NEGATIVE COVENANT WAS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY A PROPER CONSIDERATION NOR WAS THERE 
MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION. 
The lower court's theory with respect to this point 
is that defendant's promise to employ plaintiff for an 
indefinite length of time, terminable at the will of the 
defendant, is not adequate consideration to support 
plaintiff's negative covenant and that the said 
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coYenant cannot be enforced ·a.t la,Y, nor can it 
be enforced in equity because there is a lack of 
n1utuality of obligation. l~lnintiff eould have "·orked 
for defendant one day and defendant under this con-
tract could have tern1inated the employment. Certainly 
such execution of defendant's promise could not have 
justified enforcement of plaintiff's promise not to com-
pete 'vithin a t\vo mile radius for a period of five years. 
The fact that he "\vorked for a year doesn't change the 
result that an employment contract terminable at the 
will of the employer is not an adequate consideration 
or mutual obligation to support the employee's nega-
tive covenant. In fact in this particul~ar case, that 
he \vas terminated after only one year of employment 
is one of the elements that makes this negative cove-
nant not to compete for five years invalid and unen-
forceable. It vvill be pointed ou~ below that many cases 
cited by appellant can be distinguished on this ground. 
In Schneller v. Hayes (1934), Wash. 115, 28 Pac. 2d 
273, the plaintiff, an optician, employed defendant who 
brought his family from Montana to Walla Walla, 
Washington to accept said employment, on a week to 
week arrangement at $35.00 11111Veek. Defendant agreed 
to a restrictive covenant prohibiting him from com-
peting in Walia Walia and one mile outside. The court 
held the covenant unenforceable as unreasonable and 
against public policy and also as not being supported 
by sufficient consideration and refused an injunction. 
When insufficiency of consideration was argued be-
cause of lack of mutuality, it was suggested that ex-
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perience and training gained by defendant during the 
employment was consideration for the negative cove-
nant. The court said: 
''He, (the defendant) was a licensed optician, 
employed by a large optical organization, and 
presumably was thought competent for employ-
ment by appellant. There is no suggestion that 
he entered upon an apprenticeship.'' 
The court discussed the difference between enforcing 
these covenants in law and in equity, and cited Me.uer 
Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin (C.C.A.), 1 Fed. 2d 687, in 
which it is stated: 
''If, for instance, an entirely valid contract 
contain a provision for its termination by one 
party on notice to the other, though enforceable 
at law, courts of equity will not, because of such 
provision, enforce it by granting equitable relief, 
as specific performance, but will leave the ag-
grieved party to his remedy .at law. This is be-
cause the court will not grant equitable relief on 
a contract where one party can nullify its action 
by exercising his reserved power to terminate it. '' 
The Meuer Steel Barrel case, though it involved the 
question ·of mutuality of obligation because of a bi-
lateral executory contract terminable at will of one of 
the parties, did not involve a negative covenant ancil-
lary to an employment contract as did the Schnelle.r v. 
Hayes case. The court in the latter case, regardless 
of its discussion of the distinction, brought out in the 
Meuer Steel Barrel case, still insisted that even at law 
a contract such as this would be without sufficient con-
sideration. Here is the court's l'anguage : 
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d But if \Ye a~su1ne the contraet of the parties 
to be bilateral and based upon 1nutual execu-
tory promises, appellant \Yonld not bP entitled to 
injunctiYe relief. ....-\.ppellant 's prornise of ern-
ploynlent could be terminated at his pleasure, 
and \Yould not be a sufficient consideration fur 
the promise of the respondent.'' 
The annotation in 9 .... \.L·.R. at page 1481 rnakes 
reference to the case of Gilbert ·v. lV ilmer as follows : 
'·In Gilbert Y. ,.Vilmer ( 1918), 102 Misc. 388, 
168 X.Y. Supp. 1043, injunction \Yas denied to 
restrain the breach of a covenant of this char-
acter, on the ground that the provisions -vvere 
too inequitable to justify a court of equity in 
enforcing it, the agreement in effect binding the 
employee to \York as a window cleaner for the 
plaintiff as such places and in such manner as 
he \vas directed, his employment to continue as 
long as he gave satisfaction, the employer being 
the sole judge of the character of the work. The 
court pointed out that the plaintiff could have 
discharged the defendant after one hour's serv-
ice, and according to the plaintiff's con-struction 
of the contract, the defendant would have been 
prevented from working at his business as win-
dovv cleaner in that city for the period of one 
year.'' 
.And see Oppenheimer v. Hirsch (1896), 5 App. Div. 
232, 38 N.Y. Sup·p. 311, as referred to in 9 A.L.R. at 
page 1475 vvhere the court considered the fact that the 
employer reserved the right to discharge the employee 
within a v-r-eek after he began his employment as a 
further ground for refusing to enjoin the breach of the 
employees negative covenant. See also Ridley v. Krout, 
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(1947), 63 Wyo. 252, 180 Pac. 2d 124, Iron City Laundry 
Company v. Leyton (1913), 55 Pa. Super Ct. 93, 9 
A.L.R. at page 1481, and Smith Baking Co. v. Behrens 
(1933), 125 Neb. 718, 251 N.W. 826. 
That there is a lack of consideration in these cases 
is supported by the case of May v. Lee (1930), (Tex. Cir. 
App.), 28 S. W. 2d 202. In this case the defendant in 
the injunction suit had gone to work for plaintiff as an 
engineer under a contract which gave either party the 
right to terminate at will and which restricted defend-
ant from working for any of plaintiff's clients within 
one year after termination. In holding that the negative 
covenant was unenforceable because of lack of con-
sideration and mutuality, the court said: 
''After finishing his work for ·appellant with 
Clarke & Courts, appellee elected to quit the 
service of appellant, and two and one-half months 
thereafter entered the service of Clarke & Courts. 
The contract, except in so far as it was executed, 
is, we think, an unilateral agreement, ·and there 
being no consideration for the performance by 
appellee of the unexecuted provisions of the 
contract, such provisions cannot be enforced 
against him. 
* * * 
"This agreement furnishes an apt illustra-
tion of an unil'a.teral contract which is unenforce-
able by either party, except to the extent it has 
been executed. Appellant was bound to pay 
appellee the amounts specified in the agreement 
for the services rendered by appellee, and, so 
long as appellee continued in the service of appel-
lant, he wa.s bound to properly perform his 
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work and to further the intPrPst of appellant. 
But when the execution of the contract ceased, 
its unilateral charaeter rendered its unexecuted 
portion unenforceable for lack of considera-
t . '' lOll •••• 
In the principal case where the employer's pro-
mise \Yas terminable at \viii, \Ye have the added fact 
that it \Yas the employer \vho terminated the employ-
ment, not the en1ployee. It is submitted that this should 
be considered seriously in determining whether or not 
the negative covenant is enforceable. In other words, 
the contract not only lacked sufficient consideration, 
but also there \Yas not sufficient performance on the 
part of defendant to justify the enforcement of the re-
striction. The inverse of this is illustrated in the case 
of Clark Paper ~ Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher (1919), 108 
Misc. 399, 177 N.Y. Supp. 614, Affirmed in (1920) 193 
App. Div. 924, 184 N.Y. Supp. 914, where the court 
granted an injunction on the ground that the employee 
had enjoyed several years of employment and volun-
tarily terminated, but stated that the situation would be 
different had .the employee been fired before he had 
worked a length of time commensurate with the term 
of the restriction. 
In fact a premature termination by the employer 
has in some cases been considered a breach of the con-
tract by the employer, and for that reason, the courts 
have refused to grant an injunction agajnst the em-
ployer. In Economy ~Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy 
(1935), 290 Mass. 549, 195 N.E .747, the contract of em-
ployment was terminable at the will of either party, and 
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after fifteen months the employer discharged the em-
ployee without cause. The court considered such action 
arbitrary and unreasonable and as a failure of per-
formance such as to make the employer's appearance in 
court without clean hands, arn.d an injunction was re-
fused,. See also D·utch Maid Bakeries v. Schleicher 
(1942) 58 Wyo. 374, 131 Pac. 2d 630. 
In the principal case plaintiff has shown that de-
fendant pharmacy employed him under the contract for 
the specific purpose of building up a good business and 
trade at said pharmacy and that he, as any reasonable 
person would, believed that his employment would ex-
tend for as long as his work was satisfactory. Then, to 
be arbitrarily discharged smacks of breach of con-
tract and certainly places defendant in a poor position 
to seek to enforce the negative covenant. 
As is admitted by the respondent in its brief, 
page 13, plaintiff was not a mere ''soda jerk'' or clerk. 
Plaintiff was to act not only as a pharmacist but also 
as a manager and in addition, he was to acquire a pro-
prietary interest in the business itself through a stock-
bonus program. But until there were profits the pro-
mise was a mere incentive-a hope. The plaintiff called 
upon all of his managerial ability and labored long 
hours, and as shown by the evidence there was a net 
profit within six or seven months. N·ow the hope could 
materialize' 1into stock. Shortly after this position was 
gained the defendant dismissed the plaintiff without 
cause, thereby denying him from realizing this expected 
benefit and fruits of his work. This type of future 
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promise has been called a '' sPdnetiYe promise.'' In the 
case of Super 1llaid Cook- TJTa re C'orp. v. H luuil, 50 Fed. 
2d 830, the court stated: 
·" ''Tithout guaranteeing to the defendants one 
day ~s regular "~ork, \Yithout the obligation of 
the appellant to en1ploy then1 or pay them any-
thing, upon a seductiYe promise of the disclo-
sure of inforn1ation upon \vhich they may hope 
to build a profitable line of sales, the appellees 
are induced to sign a paper 'vhich, while it has 
the general appearance of a contract, but keeps 
the promise to the ear "\vhile it breaks it to the 
hope. Such a contract, wanting in mutuality, 
presenting no equitable considerations, a court of 
equity will not enforce.'' 
The contract under consideration here does not guaran-
tee the employee one day's regular work. It does guar-
antee him 30 days' notice of termination which indi-
rectly assures him of not less than 30 days work. To 
discharge the plaintiff without cause, in view of the 
circumstances already discussed, is to keep ''the pro-
mise to the ear while it breaks it to the hope.'' 
The "seductive promise'' type of case is distinct 
and separate from the two types of cases cited by the 
defendant, i.e., one type involving the usual employer-
employee relationship where the employee leaves of 
his own free will, and often with ulterior motives, or 
where the employee is discharged for cause. 
The case ·of Ridley v. Krout, 180 P2 124 (Wyo.) 
(1947), cited by the defendant, recognized the distinc-
tion, citing as support the Super Maid Cook-Ware 
case among others : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
"A number of courts have held that in cases 
in which an employee is not guaranteed em-
ployment for any great length of time, as for 
instance, when he may be dismissed on short 
notice, the contract not to go into competitive 
business thereafter has been held to be void. 
Dockstader v. Reed, 121 App. Div. 846, 106 
N.Y.S. 795; Gilbert v. Wilmer, 102 Misc. 388, 168 
N.Y.S. 1043; Iron City Laundry Co. v. Leyton, 
55 Pa. Super Maid Cook-Ware Corp. v. Hamil, 
5 Cir., 50 F. 2d 830; Schneller v. Hayes, 176 
Wash. 115, 28 P 2d 273; Love v. Miami Laundry 
Co., 118 Fla. 137, 160 So. 32; Byram v. Vaughn, 
D.C., 68 F. Supp. 981; May v. Lee, Tex. Civ. 
App., 28 S.W. 2d 202." 
In 1946 the District Court for the District of 
Columbia had an opportunity in Byram v. V aug'J'bn, 68 
F. Supp. 981, to consider this type of case. In denying 
the injunction, the above passage from the Super Maid 
Cook-Ware case was quoted and approved. The discus-
sion by the court of this doctrine is particularly illumi-
nating and applicable hereto. 
''An employer, who seeks to subject a former 
employee to such severe and drastic restrictions 
on his activities, should at least extend to him 
some assurance of financial security for a rea-
sonable time. Otherwise, the employee may find 
himself completely at his employer's mercy. 
Such a result would seem inequitable and at 
times even contrary to the dictates of humanity. 
One who seeks to restrict another's freedom of 
action, should be willing to surrender his own 
independence to .a corresponding degree. If the 
employer prefers to leave himself free to termi-
nate the employment at will in his own discre-
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tion, he should not be ~H-~corded the drastic and 
far reaching ren1edy by w·ay of an injunction to 
enforce a stipulation that would exclude the 
former employee from an opportunity freely 
to engage in the same business. '' 
III. 
IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO CASES CITED BY 
APPELLANT PLAINTIFF HEREIN ACQUIRED NO TRADE 
SECRETS. 
The plaintiff's serVIces and the defendant's busi-
ness are not of such a character as would involve the 
acquisition of special business secrets. The people 
come to a drugstore to trade. The store does not go to 
to them or in any way solicit personal orders. The so-
called trade secrets listed by the defendant do not in 
any way come under the legal definition of such and 
surely are not analogous to any protected by the courts 
m any of the cases cited by the defendant. R:idley v. 
Krout} supra, states: 
''A process commonly known in the trade 
is not a trade secret and will not be protected by 
an injunction, a trade secret being a tool, mechan-
ism or compound known only to its owner and 
those of his employees to whom it is necessary 
to- confide it.'' Victor Chemical Works v .Iliff, 
299 Ill. 532, 132 N.E. 806, 811; Process Laundry 
Co., 208 Ky. 248; Bristol v. Equitable Life As-
surance Soc., 132 N.Y. 2'64. 
''If a so-called secret process is known to 
others in the trade, no one will be enjoined from 
using it. '' Hopkins on Unfair Trade, p. 158. 
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"Trade secrets may not be construed as con-
sisting of knowledge and efficiency which defen-
dant obtained or procured through his experi-
ence.'' Inboden v. L. W. Hawker, Ohio App., 
41 N.E. 2d 271, 277. 
The pharmaceutical prescriptions are not the 
store's secrets but are brought to each store by the 
customer and could in no way be transferred to a com-
petitor. There is nothing secret about the ingredients 
us-ed; in fact Section 78-12-15, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, 79-12-15, provides that every drugstore shall pro-
vide itself with the latest edition of the United States 
Pharmacopreia and National Formul'ary which list the 
standard strength, quality and purity of all preparations 
sold or dispensed and Section 79-12-16 provides that 
unless otherwise prescribed for or specified by the 
customer all pharmaceutical preparations should be ac-
cording to the specifications listed in this book. The 
narcotic records are records that are required by fed-
eral regulations and past records surely would not be 
of value to a competitor even if the plaintiff had them 
in his poss-ession, which he does not. There were no · 
methods of buying that could be considered secrets as 
the store was new and any methods used were, and are, 
the plaintiff's. Credit programs and mark up certainly 
are not of a secretive nature; if they were, there would 
be no use for them. Trade preferences are granted to 
each store and could not be transferred by an employee 
to a competitor. Hence, there is no alternative but to 
proceed on the conclusion that there is nothing in this 
case that could be ca tagorized as ''trade secrets.'' 
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The defendant says thnt the plaintiff \\Tas ~'not a 
mere ·soda jerk' or clerk'' and surely this is so. He 
\Yas, and has al,Yays been represented as such, a man-
ager. But the plaintiff did not acquire ·a.ny trade secrets 
in that capacity. 
In J(aunzagraph Co. l'. Sta1npagraph ·Co. (1921), 
197 .. A.pp. DiY. 66, 188 N.Y. Supp 678 the Court re-
fused to enjoin defendants from engaging in the die and 
printing business notwithstanding when employed by 
plaintiff they agreed never to do so. The court insists 
that for such negative covenant to be enforceable, the 
employee must have had an opportunity to learn cer-
tain trade secrets. Here is the language of the Court: 
"Covenants ancillary to a contract of em-
ployment restricting the employees' right to 
labor along the same line, either for them-
selves or others, upon the termination of their 
employment, are not favored by the law, and 
will not be enforced, unless there are special 
circumstances that render the restriction a rea-
sonable protection to the employer's business, to 
prevent the employee from using knowledge that 
he has acquired in the course of his employ-
ment, of the secrets of the trade, methods, or 
processes of the employer. If the covenant, tak-
ing these circumstances into consideration, is not 
more extensive as to time or space than will 
afford a reasonable protection to the employer's 
business, it will be enforced . . . . Where, how-
ever, the employee brings to the employment 
skill previously acquired, and does not obtain, 
in the course of his employment, knowledge of 
methods and processes which are exclusively 
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within his employer's cont.rol and right to use, 
it cannot be said that such a restraint is rea-
sonably necessary to the employer's protection.'' 
(Italics added) 
And in the Sam;uel Stores v. Abrams, supra, in 
determining that the terms of the covenant were un-
reasonable and against public policy, the court says the 
following: . 
''This stipulation provides, in effect, that the 
defendant, for five years after he leaves the 
employ of the plaintiff, shall not either directly 
or indirectly connect himself with any firm en-
gaged in business of the plaintiff in any city 
where the plaintiff conducts one of its branch 
stores. 
"It appears from the complaint that the 
services of the defendant contracted for by the 
plaintiff are ·not peculiar or individual in their 
~haracter, nor purely intellectual, nor are they 
special or extraordinary services or acts. 
"The defendant's services and the plaintiff's 
business are not of a character to involve the 
acquisition of special business secrets of the 
plaintiff by the defendant. The agreement re-
lates merely to services in a local retail busi-
ness, and primarily aims to restrict competition. 
' ' The plain tiff conducts a local retail clothing 
business in which the defendant was employed 
as manager. The situation of manager could 
have been filled by any person of sufficient busi-
ness capacity." 
A distinction must be m~ade between a case where 
an employee comes into an established business green 
and learns trade secrets and trade practices, and the 
trained employee who brings to a new business his pro-
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fessional experience as 'vas done in the principal case. 
The plaintiff here had liYed in the coininunity for more 
than a year before g·oing to 'vork for defendant as the 
evidence sho,Ys, and a good share of the patronage and 
clientele of the drugstore consisted of friends and ac-
quaintances of plaintiff and his wife. Furthermore, the 
fact that plaintiff may have gained a personal influence 
over other customers is not reason for holding this 
covenant enforceable. In Ridley v. Krout, (1947), 63 
\\ryo. 252, 180 P2 124, the recent Wyoming case above 
cited in discussing this same problem said: 
''Everyone who lives any length of time in 
any community, as an employee, is bound to make 
acquaintances and friends and if that mere fact 
would authorize an injunction such as prayed 
herein we fear, as stated in Club Aluminum Co. 
v. Young, supra (363 Mass. 223, 160 N.E. 804) 
there would be left but ''a shadow of the general 
rule against the validity of restrictive covenants 
upon individual liberty of action as to one's trade 
or calling, and would establish in its stead what 
has hitherto been treated as an exception." The 
court in Love v. Miami Laundry Co., supra (118 
Fla. 137, 160 So. 32) stated in connection with 
the driver of a laundry truck that the employer 
.acqUired no property interest in the former's 
God given or self cultivated, ingratiating person-
ality. * * * * There is also some testimony of 
personal solicitation on his part. The su·m and 
substance of 'that testimony as we read it is that 
he solicited business from former cutomers of 
his own and from people he had known all his 
life. Defendant at the time of trial of this case 
was 52 years old and he stated he had lived in 
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Sheridan all his life. He had engaged in the 
repairing of bicycles and automobiles before 
entering the services of the plaintiff.'' 
Appellant cites the following 7 cases to show the 
enforcement of negative covenants where they are neces-
sary to protect the employer against the employee's 
use of trade secrets. The factual situations are a far 
cry from the one in issue; the main discrepancy that 
in all cases where the covenant is enforced there were 
true trade secrets which in the hands of a competitor 
would harm the employer. The type of businesses in-
volved in these cases are those that actively solicit cu~­
tomers outside their main offices, while in the case at 
hand the customers themselves contact the drugstore. 
Even with these aggravating conditions the courts re-
fused to enforce the negative covenants in 4 of the 7 
cited cases. Also, in 6 cases the employee voluntarily 
left the employment and in the 7th he was fired because 
of intemperate habits. 
Ideal Laundry Co. v. Gugliemone, 151 A. 617, 'ap-
pellant's brief page 13, held that employment alone is 
sufficient consideration where the employee gains knowl-
edge of business methods and secrets the disclosure 
of which to a rival would r,esult in irreparable injury 
to the employer. The secrets here were actually uni-
que and secret methods used by the employer in his 
laundry business. The employee was floor supervisor 
in the float-iron department and the company had re-
cently expended $20,000 in employing these new methods 
and processes of which he knew. H,e voluntarily left 
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the employer ·'s laundry to \York for a con1petitor to 
""hom kno\Yledge of these secrets \Yonld be valuable to 
the detriment of his employer. So the detern1ining fac-
tors here \Yere the actual trade secrets, e1nployee 
voluntarily lea.Ying, and an elen1ent of bad faith, all of 
\Yhich are absent in the case under consideration. 
The court refused to enforce the negative cove-
nant in Bond Electric Corpora.tion v. Keller, 166 A. 341, 
appellant's brief p. 13, even though it vvas a contract 
( $3,000 if he \Youldn 't disclose any knowledge of trade 
customers or policies nor work for competitors) that 
\Yas made after termination of employment. The lan-
guage ·of the court could be applied to the instant case 
as they said : 
"A contract, the sole object of which is to re-
strain competition is void as in restraint of 
trade .... No restraint of trade can be enforced 
unless the covenant is merely ancillary to the 
main purpose of the main contract and necessary 
to protect the employer in the enjoyment of the 
legitimate fruits of the contract or to protect 
him from the dangers of the unjust use of those 
fruits by the other party.'' 
The covenant in this case fits perfectly under this state-
ment as it is not ancillary to the main purpose of the 
contract and is not made to protect the employer from 
the disclosure of any trade secrets but is pure re-
straint of trade. If $3,000 is insufficient consideration, 
surely the court will not in this case find that mere em-
ployment, without disclosure of trade secrets is suf-
ficient consideration. 
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The Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Co., 179, 
N.Y.S., 325, appellant's brief p. 13, case was later 
reversed. Here there were true trade secrets involved 
and the lower court granted the injunction. The 
employer manufactured raw film products and em-
ployed chemists to perfect the processes which he 
guarded and kept secret from competitors. The em-
ployee was given knowledge of these processes and 
formulre and his agreement not to disclose them or com-
pete with the employer when enforced by the court in 
the first case. In the second Kodak case the court 
held that the enforcement of the negative covenant was 
not necessary for the protection of the employer (even 
though secret processes were involved and also here 
a competitor was offering higher wages to get him to 
leave, but said that they would grant an injunction to 
restrain the disclosure of secrets of manufacture only 
and that they would not enforce the negative covenant 
in the contract to stop him working for a competitor. 
The employee voluntarily left and was not fired, and 
the second defendant in the case was a competitor who 
was trying to entice the employee away, impliedly be-
cause he wanted to gain these trade secrets. The strong-
est language of the court in the first Kodak case was: 
''An employer can require as a part consid-
eration of one being employed such agreement 
as will properly protect his trade secrets.'' 
This is not applicable in our case, there being no 
trade secrets involved. The plaintiff's contention is 
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supported by the second Kodak case wherein the 
court said: 
""The common lR\V prohibited such contracts 
and this rule has been modified only to a cer-
tain extent. ' ' 
The court also cited Strobridge Litho Co. v. Crane, 12, 
N. Y. Supp. 898, 899, which held: 
''As a general rule equity will not interfere 
to restrain by injunction a violation of a re-
strictive covenant in relation to personal serv-
ices.'' 
Then the court said that there are cases where the 
covenant against entering the employ of another was 
enforced, where the employee violated his contract by 
leaving before the expiration of his employment, indi-
cating that the moving cause for the enforcement was 
the employee's violation of contract, which is a strong 
equitable consideration not involved in the instant case. 
In the Davey Tree 'Exp-ert Co. v. Black, 244 N.Y.S. 
239, appellant's brief p. 14, case the employee had 
obtained scientific and confidential information on tree 
surgery through instructions given him by his em-
ployer. The agreement, which they held him to, was 
that he would not work for another within a year 
after he severed his employment. Undoubtedly if the 
employer had done the severing, as in our case, the 
court would not have allowed the injunction. 
The extenuating circumstances in Elbe File and 
Binder Co. v. Fine, 242 N.Y.S. 632, are that the employee 
learned all he knew about the business from the em-
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ployer and also became acquainted with real trade 
secrets. Also, the employee was given a 3 year con-
tract of employment which the court held was valid 
consideration for the negative covenant saying: 
''the period of time of employment without 
fear of discharge at will of the employer con-
stitutes sufficient consideration." 
Also, further bad faith was shown when they proved 
that the employee entered the contract believing the 
covenant to be unenforceable. 
In Stonemwn v. Wilson, 192 S.E. 816, ·appellant's 
brief p. 14, the employee o\vned stock in the hardware 
store in which he worked. The negative covenant was part 
consideration for the selling of said stock. Further, 
the employee was discharged for cause, namely intem-
perate habits. Even with all these circumstances the 
court refused to enforce the injunction. 
Chandler, Gardner & Williams v. Reynolds, 145 
N.E. 476, 250 Mass. 309, cited on page 14 of appel-
lant's brief, differs from this case because there the 
court found that the employer had sufficient cause 
to discharge the employee because he refused, failed 
and neglected to properly perform his work. Moreover, 
the employer agreed to teach the employee its secret 
methods of embalming and one of the purposes of the 
contract was to prevent the employee from taking 
advantage of this given knowledge. There was no 
teaching by the defendant of secret methods to use 
in the drug store, the plaintiff being in full charge. 
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.. A ..nother exan1ple ""here the en1ployee \Yas disndssed 
for cause, cited by defendant, is lT' ahlgren v. Barusch 
<-S· Lonl,b Optical Co., C.C . ..:-\. Ill., 68 F. 2d 6'60, affiriuing, 
D. C., Bausch <-S· Lonz.b Optical Co. v. 1Vahlgren, 1 F. 
Supp. 799. There \Yas evidence of an unauthorized 
taking of n1oney by the employee and the employer had 
asked for the employee's resignation due to such con-
duct and personal habits detrimental to the employer's 
interests. There \Yas also evidence of a general con-
nivance to leave the business of his employer and enter 
into a competing business. The court said: 
''We conclude that the master was justified 
in finding Oscar (defendant in the case) was one 
of the co-conspirators in the unlawful enterprise 
which was conceived by his brother in violation 
of that gentleman's written agreement." 
The court in justifying its decision spoke of attempts 
to conspire to wrongfully injure the employer's busi-
ness and of an "enticing away", all of which are 
elements of bad faith on the employee's part which 
are entirely lacking in our case. 
~Once again in Tolman Laundry Co. v. Walker, 187 
A. 836, 838, 171 Md. 7, appellant's brief p·. 15, the 
employee ''. . . voluntarily severed his- connection with 
the laundry p-ursuant to a provision in his contract." 
The court said : 
''The testimony is conclusive that when the 
defendant severed his relation with his master 
on Aug. 17, 1935, he became the servant of 
another corporation which was engaged in the 
same business as his former master.'' 
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The appellant cites at page 15 Durbow Commission 
Co. v. Donner, 229 N.W. 635, 201 Wis. 175. The de-
fendant in this case demurred to the complaint asking 
for an injunction and the court overruled the demurrer. 
Although the court discussed the general law, the case 
only held that the demurrer to the complaint should 
have been sustained on the basis that the plaintiff 
had not pleaded sufficient facts. 
Eigelbach ·v. Boone Loan and Investment Company, 
287 S.W. 225, appellant's brief p. 15, can be distin-
guished from the case in issue in that the employee 
voluntarily left the employer's service and was not 
summarily discharged 'after having been led to believe his 
employment was of a permanent nature as the plaintiff 
was in this case. Also, there was a true trade secret 
involved in the cited case. The defendant had a 
customer list in his possession through which a com-
peting loan company -could make contacts. A loan 
company solicits customers whereas the customers come 
to a drug store and the store does not go to them. 
When an employee of a clothing business took with 
him customer lists, statistical data, and records which 
had been collected at great expense to the employer, 
the court in M oskrin Bros. Inc. v. Swartzberg, 155 S.E. 
154, 199 N.C. 539, appellant's brief p. 15, the court 
prevented him from injuring his former employer by 
working for a competitor. 
In Grmnd Union Tea Co. v. Walker, 195 N.E. 277, 
203 Ind. 245, 98 A.L.R. 958, appellant's brief p. 15, al-
though the court discussed several of its own deci-
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sions dealing 'Yith injunctions "There t?e sale of a 
business had been inYolved, the court noted that they 
had never decided a case involving the employer-
enlployee relationship; consequently they turned to the 
decisions of other jurisdictions. The court relied on 
seYeral rases but quoted rather extensively from two. 
They said the rase of Deverling v. City Baking Corn-
pa;n,y (1928), 155 ~fd. 280, 141 A. 542, 545, 67 A.L.R. 
993, involved Yery similar facts to the case in the deci-
sion. In that case the employee left the employment 
of the company and within a few days entered the 
employment of a competing company. The court then 
noted that this \\~as a case where the employee violated 
the negative covenant in order to sell his services to 
a competitor at a higher wage. The other case was 
the Chandler case, supra, and ·as already noted the 
employee was fired for cause and moreover the em-
ployer had instructed him in his own secrets of em-
balming as a part of his employment. 
The court held in May v. Young, 2 Atl. 2d 385, 
appellant's brief p. 15, that unless they enforced the 
negative covenant the employee would be .making use 
of his knowledge acquired during his employment to 
the detriment of his employer. But in this case it 
involved an engineering firm and the employee had 
in his possession a confidential list of clients the firm 
contacted, a list of prospective clients and confiden-
tial records ; none of which exist in the instant case. 
The court granted an injunction in the case of 
Granger v. Craven, 52 A.L.R. 1356, appellant's brief 
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p. 16, but here they were dealing with the unique pro-
fession of doctoring. The employee was hired as an 
assistant to an established doctor. The court repeatedly 
emphasized that the reason for enforcing such an 
injunction in this case was because of the confidential 
relationship existing between a doctor and his patients 
and the fact that the patients treated by the employee 
would be so likely to follow him to a new location. 
A drugtsore manager cannot in any way be compared 
to a doctor and his patients in that the drugstore 
customers do not buy his knowledge and advice but 
his products. The court pointed out a doctor's pro-
fessional status by using such phrases as: 
'' . . . a professional man . . . giving the other 
access to the confidence of his clients . . . and 
would attract a number of the employer's pa-
tients .... 
''A specialist may be presumed to acquire 
as firm a hold upon patients as the drivers of 
a laundry wagon.· . . . Different conditions at-
tend professional employment from those which 
go with the more conventional relation of mas-
ter and servant.'' 
The reasons for the court's decision of granting 
an injunction in Davvey Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein, 
25 S.W. 2d 62, 233 Ky. 115, appellant's brief p. 16, 
are obvious when the factual situation is noted. The 
employee received a three month course of instruc-
tion from the employer in the art or science of tree 
surgery and was paid during this period of instruc-
tion. Soon after that the employee voluntarily left 
the employer's business and went into a competing 
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business for hin1self. The court also pointed out that 
he left "~ithout justification. 
In Hydra-ulic P·ress Jllfg. Co. v. Lake Erie Engi-
neering Corp, et al. (1942), 2nd Circuit, 132 Fed. 403, 
the situation is son1ew·hat similar to that in the instant 
case except that the employee vras hired as a design-
ing engineer rather than as a pharmacist and manager 
of a drug store. His \York consisted of designing 
hydraulic presses. He \vas under the supervision of 
the head engineer. He exercised his own talents and 
ingenuity and had access to the files of the plaintiff 
and all its engineering data and methods of practice. 
It was held that the lower court properly found that 
the employee was not in possession of any trade secrets 
belonging to the plaintiff and further that the nature 
of his employment with the plaintiff did not make it 
reasonably necessary for the protection of plaintiff in 
its business to restrict him from entering the employ 
of plaintiff's competitors after leaving plaintiff's em-
ployment. The court said that this situation must not 
be confused with the situation of that of a salesman 
"whose acquaintance and personal relationships with 
customers of the plaintiff might enable him to divert 
their trade unfairly to a competitor." 
.And in Roy v. Bolduc, supra, where it was held 
that a real estate salesman's negative covenant was 
unenforceable, the court said: 
"It is accordingly held that while an employ-
er, under a proper restrictive agreement can 
prevent a former employee from using his trade 
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or business secrets, and other confidential knowl-
edge gained in the course of the employment, 
and from enticing away old customers, he has 
no right to unnecessarily interfere with the 
employee's following any trade or calling for 
which he is fitted and from which he may earn 
his livelihood and he cannot preclude him from 
exercising the skill and general knowledge he 
has acquired or increased through experience or 
even instructions while in the employment.'' 
Appellant cites at page 11 of its brief the recent 
Utah case of Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks (1950), 
------ U t. ______ , 225 Pac. 2d 739, which is not in point. 
The courts have always differentiated between con-
tracts involving the sale of business and their good 
will and a contract which involves only an employer-
employee relationship. In the latter case the courts 
are more cautious in granting injunctions. Moreover, 
this case is not in point for the further reason that 
the question of the contract being an unreasonable 
restraint of trade was not even raised by the appellant 
in his brief nor was it considered by the court . 
• 
The court in the Valley Mortuary case was keenly 
aware of the fact that the case involved the sale of 
a business, stating: 
''Furthermore, where an established business 
has been sold with its good will and there is 
a valid covenant not to compete in a certain 
territory, the breach of such a covenant entitles 
the injured party to injunctiv~ relief practically 
as a rna tter of course. '' ( Citations omitted.) 
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This is the only situation considered by the court in 
that case and it does not touch on the situation In-
volYed here-the employer-employee relationship. 
IV. 
THE QUESTION OF ESTOPPEL CANNOT FIRST BE 
RAISED ON APPEAL . 
.. A ..ppellant 's argument that respondent is estopped 
from attacking the negative covenant because of having 
accepted benefits of the contract seems out of order 
at this time. At no stage in the proceedings in the 
lower court was the question raised. A failure to 
assert a defense of nonperformance of a condition 
precedent to bring suit cannot be urged for the first 
time on appeal. 4 C.J.S. 448. This rule has been 
applied to a lack of tender, Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. 
Home Savings Bank of Los Angeles, 182 Pac. 293, 
180 Cal. 601, 5 A.L.R. 1193. Furthermore, as a general 
rule a party -cannot for the first time on appeal raise 
the question of estoppel. 4 C.J.S. 451. 
Appellant claims that respondent should have made 
a tender to do equity. Would appellant require that 
respondent return all the salary he received while 
employed, or just the salary for the last 30 days dur-
ing which time he was not required to report for work~ 
If the former, the claim is ridiculous, for appellant 
received its quid pro quo for every bit of salary it 
paid respondent up to the day he was asked not to 
report back to work. If the latter, the claim is like-
wise ridiculous for the reason that it has nothing to 
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do with this action fo1 a declaratory judgment. 2 Pom-
eroy on Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed. 59, section 387 
says that the maxim, "he who seeks equity must do 
equity" does not apply where the relief sought by 
the plaintiff and the equity sought by the defendant 
belong to or grow out of two entirely separate ·and 
distinct matters. Furthermore, according to Lawrence 
on Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 1090, the maxim does 
not require that the plaintiff tender any particular act, 
or offer to do equity, though to incorporate such an 
offer in a bill might be good practice. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
CO~CLUSION 
Plaintiff accepted en1ployn1ent with defendant, 
'Yent into an absolutely ne'Y store building and as 
manager and pharu1acist for defendant stocked the 
store and started the business. He had lived in the 
neighborhood for over a year and had many friends 
and acquaintances. These people, as well as friends of 
the o'Yners of defendant pharmacy, to be sure, patron-
ized the store. The fact that plaintiff's contract pro-
vided for his participation in the profits and other 
things led him to believe his employment would be 
comparatively permanent. After one year of operation 
when the business was beginning to show a profit, 
defendant discharged plaintiff for no reason .and with-
out cause. Now defendant threatens to enforce a nega-
tive covenant that would restrict plaintiff from com-
peting with defendant either as principal or employee 
within a radius of two miles for five years. According 
to the cases cited, said area is unreasonably large for 
the reason that it is larger than is necessary to the 
protection of the defendant. Furthermore, a five year 
period of restriction is certainly not consistant with 
his having worked there for just one year and a con-
tract guaranteeing no more than 30 days employment 
certainly lacks mutuality. To the unreasonableness of 
these provisions, add the fact that plaintiff's covenant 
was not supported by consideration and it will be 
.evident that to restrict plaintiff from working in the 
two mile area for five years would be a gross injustice. 
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For these reasons we urge the court to affirm the 
judgment of the lower court which granted equitable 
relief to the plain tiff in declaring that the said nega-
tive covenant is invalid and unenforceable. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. RICHARDS, 
J. RICHARD BELL, 
JACQUE BELL, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
50 Richards Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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